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De Servo Arbitrio:
The End of Liberty
in Martin Heidegger
Eugenio Mazzarella
Time, history and being are key words in the Heideggerian
canon. Grasping the web inscribed by these guiding words is for
Heidegger tantamount to touching the very thing of thinking. What
calls for this tampering is a necessity of thinking, which is to know
itself and its most intimate possibilities. This is especially true today
when thinking is the thinking of a world which for over a century now
finds itself bound by the constrictions of its planetary interconnexions,
assuming them as a destiny. A destiny in which technology is no
longer understood as an immobile mainspring but as a loaded gun or
primary engine. In these straits thinking must still essay to know
something about the status of its link to Being, at a time when this link
-- which is originary to philosophy -- is, even after historical consciousness, even after Heidegger, wholly historically articulated.
Whether thinking, or human thought, is in some guise master of
itself, or free, -- to say it with a word that is Christian, or at the very
least referenced to an ontology of chance, of the occurrence as arbitrio,-or whether it is bent on the mere reflection of necessity, is a question
that can be decided on the basis of how this historical articulation of
Being and thinking is concretely thought. If we assume, with
Heidegger, that
the analysis of the historicity of Dasein will show that this entity is not
'temporal' because 'it stands in history', but that, on the contrary, it
exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very
basis of its Being, 1

the real issue then becomes: what is the meaning of existing historically? Will it mean, against this foundation, being-dependent or beingfree? Yet, in concreto, in concrete existence, the question is decided on
the practical side of analysis, in the effective and unthought decision.
If the definition of philosophy as universal and phenomenological ontology and stemming from the hermeneutics of Dasein assumes
thematically that the analytic of existence (insofar as a showing of the
constitution of the Being of Dasein), remains only one way of the
research, the problem for us becomes that of seeing how a philosophiDIFFERENT/A
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cal inquiry returns to its place of origin, existence, once the sense of
Being has been made manifest.
Everything revolves around the specific results of the programmatic structure of the inquiry in Being and Time, as is expounded in
paragraph eight, especially the first part. That is, on the way the
results of the first and second section (care, Sorge, and temporality,
Zeitlichkeit)are related to the horizon of the third part, the Temporalitiit,
which was not written in 1927 but much later and known as Time and
Being.
It is well known how Heidegger connects the results of the first
section, concerning the unitary structure of Dasein, Sorge, with the
conclusions reached at the end of the second section, which deals with
its sense, or temporality . If care is "the formal existential totality of the
whole of the ontological structures of Dasein," "the having before
being already (a world) insofar as being-alongside (the entity met
within the world,' 1 ) (SZ, § 41) in the concreteness of existence, the
sense of the Dasein is manifested (as care which decides under the
urgency of anxiety) through the assumption, on the part of the existing
being, of its own temporality, Zeitlichkeit,in the self-appropriating temporality of the event (situation and occurring).
It is with the above determination of the Zeitlichkeit as the sense
of the being of Dasein that Being and Time concludes. Yet this leaves
open the question of the anchoring -- which is the declared aim of the
Seinfrage -- of the sense of being of Being in relation to the sense of
Being in general, a mooring which requires a more precise determination of the latter. However, leaving the question open does not prejudge possible developments.
Here a prejudice might reside in the fact that the sense of the
being of Being is insufficiently determined the moment it is reduced,
as in Being and Time, to a Zeitlichkeitin which temporality and spatiality of Being are not thought as co-originary and co-structuring the
being of Being. The rethinking of the rapport between spatiality and
temporality in the structure of the being of Being must be entrusted to
an amplification of the ontologically disclosing character of Dasein,
being-there (for entities as well), especially if directed toward the work
of art. It is this redefinition in terms of the spatio-temporal character of
Being-there that allows for the realization [esecuzione = execution, carrying out] of the Question of Being as anchorage of Dasein to Being. It
is precisely the tempo-spatial trait that makes human Dasein and
Dasein in general ontologically coherent with the being of Being, with
its originary modality as aperture, which constitutes originary spatiotemporality, clearing of the origin, event that tempospatializes and
spatiotemporalizes, in short the originary self-manifesting of Being
which in its withdrawing allocates to itself the totality of entities.
Otherwise put, this represents the concrete manifestation of the turn
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that occurs between Being and Time and Time and Being, a showing of
the circularity that exists in the appropriating-disappropriating
dynamic of Being thought as Event. Of this redefinition of the
Question of Being Heidegger offers a final version in the 1962 conference Time and Being, which we may take as a synthetic yet complete
third part of the project begun in 1927.
In this context, the Zeitung der Zeitlichkeit of Dasein rethought in
its co-originary spatiality is here shown as rooting itself in the structure of Being as Anwesen, as a coming to presence of the three directions of temporal-spatial ecstasies of Being itself. This Anwesen is really
Zeit-Raum, the free space of time, Dimensione, originary ekstatikon in
which rests the ekstatikon that makes up the sense of the being of
Dasein. In the ekstatikonthe tridimensionality of the ecstasies is reunited in an originary and structuring quadridimension, the cogent correspondence of the ecstasies, which constitutes their cogent co-determination and, in their extension, the reciprocal determining factor, or the
fact of their reciprocal necessity. This fourth dimension, that is, necessity, is actually the first of the four, "the bringing that determines all
else". 2 The Anwesen is the bond, the Janus head, time itself become
world that links the spatio-temporality of Dasein to the Urphiinomen,to
the Ursacheof the Lichtung and wherein Es gibt Sein, Es gibt Zeit. This
Ursacheis the Gabe,which Heidegger modulates in the doctrine of the
Ereignis as "destination" ("Schicken") of being, as time in the sense of
the freeing bringing in the Open. (SD 18) In the giving of the Es gibt
Sein "as destining and as gathering of the destinations ... [what is]
ordained each time in a destiny is the presence of Being in its epochal
changes." (SD 17)
By means of this doctrine of the Ereignis as a marker of the
Geschick of Being which assigns to itself every possible history
Heidegger succeeds in "elaborating the Temporality (Temporalitiit)of
Being." (SZ § 5) With this development the phenomenological ontology planned in Being and Time is accomplished: Heidegger's specific
brand of phenomenology, its "theoretical" reason at least, appears
legitimately to subside. The thought that sees has followed the phenomenon of Being to the last trace of the visible, along the guiding
thread of time. Beyond that trace, where the phenomenon of Being
"turns" upon itself, subtracting itself (as Enteignis) from sight, it is no
longer possible to strive for a thought which intends to remain philosophically true to a universally communicable seeing undergoing the
rigors of a "scientific" exhibition, to be shared through discourse, or
loyal to a known verdict on the non transience (for finite knowledge)
of the Absolute.
It is precisely here, however, at the place where Heidegger's theoretical reason calms down and all but vanishes, that a task arises for
thinking, for our practical reason.
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The moment has come for us to go all the way and attempt to figure out what is the meaning of existing historically for a Dasein whose
temporal ecstaticalness is rooted in the ecstases of Being as sending
and destiny. The problem facing us, therefore, is to verify whether
Heidegger's way of thinking this rootedness of the Dasein in Being
does not end up being a crucifixion of the Zeitlichkeit of human Dasein
upon the Temporaliti:it
of Being. In other words, the question is whether
Heidegger's freedom of the Dasein bears in its bosom the self-centralizing action of chance, of the liberoarbitrio,or whether it doesn't actually relinquish this possibility in favor of the phenomenological rigor of
theory as a thinking which conceives of Being reflexively, perhaps
embracing it without reservations. Of course this may be read as the
transcription of an intolerable anxiety for this mode of thinking, the
anxiety for freedom which is proper to a man facing either the personal, free God (a free god who freely creates a man who is free even
before god), or the radical nothingness of a nihilism of the world bereft
even of the last, ancient god: the necessity of the world, the how of its
holding together.
My thesis is that the freedom of the Heideggerian Dasein is a
freedom which is merely "reflexive," which is reflection of and adherence to the freedom of Being as it manifests itself. It is a freedom
which is bound phenomenologically. If we bear in mind Heidegger's
critique of Husserl's eidetic reason, it is paradoxically the link of the
eidos which forces thinking to say yes to it: the manifest historicity of
the event that becomes the thing itself of thought, and a determining
factor. Understood in the wake of the freedom of thought as freedom
from the lack of awareness, from the darkness of cognitive egoism,
radical jahsagento one's situation in the world, Heidegger's freedom is
nothing other than the acceptance of truth understood as manifestation, the freeing of Being in the beings. Despite his critique of the traditional notion of truth as the conformity of thought to thing, Heidegger
is still operating in the shadow of this very notion, albeit ontologically
radicalized. The freedom of the Dasein is for him solidly anchored to
an idea of freedom as conforming to Being, ultimately to the eidos of
the event, despite the fact that this eidos is thought in a kairological
manner, in the imperscrutable certainty of its when and why. Of the
Christian kairological appeal what fails is the essential postulate, the
eventfulness of the answer which may actually not be given. Yet with
this possibility what falls apart is Christian freedom itself, the freedom
of faith, which always requires the essential invisibility of the things
believed in. This is an entirely Greek answer to the anxiety of faith, or
if we prefer an answer to the essential freedom in nothingness. Being
certainly no longer needs justification -- god cannot be sought through
the pietas of Job or the Quolehet.Yet for this ultimate pietas of thinking
toward god or toward Being, which no longer calls for judgment, in
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the end what is required is adequation to the dicta of the "seen" of
Being in order to be justified in terms of pietas. What permeates this
perspective is still the mythology of the eye which does not mislead if
only it is purified by vision. The faith in invisible things -- non verifiable or vivified faith, ex auditu in one's own conscience -- is the untenable territory of Heideggerian anxiety which, beyond radical nothingness, exhibits the binding necessity of the event given to the gaze.
This "reflexive" determination of the freedom of Being on the
part of the freedom of the Dasein is directly influenced by the
Ontological equivalences that Heidegger sets up between Being and
being, manifestation, truth, freedom. Freedom is but "a free yielding to
a conformity which obliges:" a yielding which is "possible only if we
are free for that which manifests itself in a disclosure. This being-free
expresses the essence of freedom which until today has remained misunderstood: the opening of the relating that makes conformity intrinsically possible is founded on freedom: the essence of truth is freedom. 3
And further on, we read that
'man does not possess' truth, if anything he is truth, the ek-sistent and
un-concealing Dasein [which] possess man in a more originary way so
that it can, by itself, gard and garantee for humanity the relationship to
being as such in its totality. ..freedom understood as the letting-be of
being, sets forth and realizes the essence of truth in the sense of the
unconcealing of being. (WW, p. 190)

As can be gleaned from these texts, it is not only the conformity
of logical truth which is possible solely upon the foundation of ontological truth (freedom as the manifestation of Being, its giving itself
freely in the clearing that allows being to come forth), but moral truth
and freedom as well. The link is all the more cogent as it is imperscrutable. The kairological element of the Geshick of Being, of the
decree of Being, does not lend itself to comprehensive analysis or to
discoursive reason, but only to suggestions, to hints of thought.
Moreover, it does not lend itself to intuition or to a seeing within the
occurrence, preferring rather to emerge with some aspect, from everything that thinking can touch insofar as presence, to a beckoning
toward what befalls us, to ourselves, to meditative clues that hover
about. Heidegger's relationship to Being is aptly described by Rilke: "I
fly about God, around the ancient tower, and I fly along the centuries."
It is only upon this "we ourselves" as weltet, that is, as Selbstwelt,
Mitwelt, Umwelt, that it is possible to unfold a continuing analysis. Yet
in the Heideggerian perspective this analysis shows an originary reciprocal link that extends from the necessary and cogent factual coexistence of these concentric spheres to the reciprocal co-determination
within the intimate sphere of the Selbstwelt, in that existential seed
which makes it authentic: decision. In the existential concreteness of
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the Dasein, the care that decides assumes upon itself its own temporality: for at the urgency of anxiety, one must decide for something, and
this something is time, one's proper time, being insofar as it gives itself
as past, as present, as future. Heidegger's assumption that temporality
is part of the care that decides, is grounded entirely on the necessary
co-determination and reciprocal necessitating of the ecstasies. In its
ontological fullness, that is, in its deliberate awareness, the ecstatic
Zeitlichkeitis here nothing but re-flection of the ecstatic Temporalitiitof
Being. The way in which there's no horizontal caesura between the
ecstasies of the Zeitlichkeit, in like manner there's no vertical caesura
between the complex of these ecstasies and the ecstaticalness of Being.
The problem of human freedom, on the other hand, would consist in inserting a caesura in this corraling of human freedom toward
the reflexivity of the freedom of Being, and within the same co-exstensivity of the temporal ecstasies of the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein. A caesura
right in the necessity of the continuum Being-Dasein and of the continuum of Being with itself. In other words, it becomes a question for
Dasein to recover that characteristic of Enteignis, and of withdrawing
from the continuum of Being, that arbitrary withdrawing which is in
Being itself. Again, our goal is: to recuperate for human Dasein its veri tati ve character, free to refuse to submit to the reflection of the
announcing
of Being, the free choice (arbitrio) of denying this
announcing in favor of another one, even if it is posited by itself to
itself. The identity of Being and thinking, which is onto-logic cobelonging,
cannot be resolved
in an excessive Parmedian
(pseudo )moralistic intellectualism, in a common moral identity.
When framing man's being within Being, and thinking as action
(and as moral action) is effectively reduced to the reflexivity of the
ontic, then there's nothing left of concrete human freedom. Thinking
can be denken as danken, "serving that frees" 4 within the ontological
realm, not the moral one. In this case thinking may at best free us
from the anxiety of a truly moral way of thinking by linking up with a
choice which we wish to be "right" insofar as being merely taken,
even within the spiritual storm of the ineluctable. Free moral thinking
is instead a lordly thinking which does not possess the fallacious pietas
that relinquishes its sovereignty, and which refuses to take refuge in
the binding force of a decree -- what to all effects amounts to an
expected excusatio,for when matters unfold in an unwanted manner,
one can always say "I was following an order." Moral thinking is
always open, constitutively a crossroads whereupon we can be lost.
There is no other moral way of thinking. Of course we can always follow precepts, or a venerable tradition, or even accept the divine word
as revealed and unquestionable truth. Yet once again the question
whether action taken is really moral -- intentionally, beyond actual
effects, beyond any discourse on the responsability of the effects -- is
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something that can be known only a posteriori:the certainty of heartfelt
judgment is always also a judgment dependent on timeliness, or on
the appropriateness of time. The peculiar anxiety of Heideggerian
ontology is actually a fleeing from this anxiety, which is dependent
upon time and wherein my freedom yields itself as truth.
Because in concrete, historical existence to decide is always to
decide for the being which is given as past, present, or future, and
which as ecstasy colors all other ecstasies, action, choice itself, the
resulting anxiety yields an ontologization of the present, of what happens now, rooted not in the future (which would correspond to hope
in Christianity, to the awaiting the result of my present decision), but
in the past, in the ctonic weight of having-been. In the concrete indecision of the present, of the now, the anxiety of the ineluctable is not as
great, for this Stimmung, as the pure anxiety of the future. In fact, it
seems to give this anxiety a reassurance: I will be because I havealways-been. To partake of a destiny is still more reassuring than risking not having any.
What the nature of time is on a formal plane has already been
grasped and described once and for all by St. Augustine: ecstasy of
past-present-future (such at least is the apperceived structure of our
present consciousness, of the mind that follows the collapse of the
bicameral mind). But is time, in its concreteness, solely this formal
structure? The answer is clearly no. This structure is full of content, it
is a content: the content of the decision here and now of a sliver of
time. This decision, the tooth in the wheel of time, strikes on the past,
or the present, or the future. In the Christian version of time, one of its
fundamental modalities is the beating on the future that guides the
rolling of the wheel. Every decision, decision-time, is ancient (then),
monumental (now as then) or critical (cut the now with a new now, so
that there is no longer a word: then, now?), the clearing of a passage in
the necessitating continuum.
At this juncture, that the ontological reflexivity of Heideggerian
freedom ends up yielding on the ontic plane to the ctonic weight of the
past is, in Heidegger's mind, a matter not only of fact (its specific political result), but of right. Heidegger's ontological freedom as "conscious
staying-inside the being in its totality, which must be borne," 5 a realization of Being in us for which the resolved Dasein finds itself always
already decided, has at its side the structure of Schelling's freedom
from the 1809 treatise, to which Heidegger dedicates a symbiotic commentary. Here also, in Schelling's words,
the single action follows from the inner necessity of being free ..which
should not be misunderstood ...with the empirical necessity based on
costriction: ... This inner necessity is itself liberty, man's being is essentially his own act: necessity and liberty are between themselves as a single being, and it is only if looked at individually that they seem to be
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different: but in itself it is liberty, formally is is necessity ... in the original creation, man is un undecided being, but he can decide for himself.
Yet this decision cannot happen in time, but falls outside any time, it
doesn't itself belong to time, but to eternity ... •

As we can see, it is the monogram of the resoluteness of Being
and Time that engages in the "ineluctable" of the historical decision of
the German Dasein of the thirties of being for oneself, of assuming
one's proper essence when facing nothingness, at the risk of dissappearing on the scene of the being: the monogram of secularization, in
the Weimer climate, of the specific Schellingian curvature of the predestination which "saves" freedom by making of the man who acts
thus here the man who has acted since eternity and already in the
beginning of creation. From its inception the German Dasein has chosen to be such, once it has been thrown into beings. And today's
choice, the today of 1933, of the Discours der Rektorat on the self-affirmation of the German university, is simply the confirmation of
German Dasein's having been wanted to be from the very beginning.
But this liberty as agreement with the dictates of a root which is
effective influence of the past upon the now-choice for a future, which
removes from this future the novum of hope in order to consign it to
the execution of a dictate, and which at most has been desired solely in
the dimension of the immemorial, this liberty is no less than the freedom-necessity of private Dasein. Its only mode of subsisting, if it were
to be authentic, is by the appropriation of a link to human will which
lies outside of it yet constitutes its truth. Thereby disclosing the constrictions of a fate that rebukes the essential responsibility of salvation,
or the chance of losing oneself as a real alternative. It is more a subtle
proud and nihilistic gesture, the assumption of the inexplicable in
terms of the ineluctable,than a true letting oneself be that, understanding not, yet entrusts itself to a mimesis of faith as trust, the
Heideggerian Gelassenheit.
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